The public-health community views the mandatory labelling and taxation of fat as promising tools to control the growth of food-related chronic disease. This paper is the …rst to propose an ex ante evaluation of these two policy options in an oligopolistic setting with differentiated products and heterogeneous demand. Using household scanner data on fromages blancs and dessert yogurts, we separately identify consumer preferences for fat and front-ofpack fat labels by exploiting an exogenous di¤erence in legal labelling requirements between these two product categories. Demand estimates are then combined with a supply model to evaluate both policies. In the absence of any producer price response, making fat labels mandatory reduces the fat supplied to regular consumers in this market by 38%; an ad-valorem tax of 10% (5%) on the producer price of full-fat (half-skimmed) products has a similar impact.
Introduction
What e¤ects do fat taxes and mandatory fat labels have in food markets? In the context of a worldwide rise in overweight and obesity, such market-based policies have attracted a great deal of interest from policy-makers and public-health advocates. We here provide an empirical evaluation of these interventions, comparing their e¤ects on key market indicators and health outcomes, such as equilibrium prices, market shares, producer pro…ts, consumer welfare, and the quantity of fat purchased by households.
Fat in calories available for human diet represents between 40 and 45% of total daily calorie intake in most OECD countries, as against 20-30% one century ago (Popkin and Gordon-Larsen, 2000; James et al., 2004; Oliver, 2006; Etilé, 2011) . This trend has been related to the spectacular growth in obesity and overweight, which has reached epidemic proportions globally, with more than 1 billion adults being overweight worldwide in 2010 (OECD, 2010) . In this context, the OECD has called for the implementation of tax policies on food items with high calory, fat, or sugar contents (Cecchini et al., 2010) . 1 A separate public policy proposed by the European Parliament is the mandatory labelling of the fat-content on fronts-of-packs (FOP): this is easier to use than the back-of-pack nutritional facts panel, which is already mandatory. FOP labels may help consumers to move from high to low fat-content products (Wansink et al., 2004; Grunert and Wills, 2007) . 2 To date, FOP nutritional labelling has been voluntary. One key element of this debate is that voluntary FOP labelling does not only play an informational role, it also contributes to di¤erentiation and market segmentation. When labelling is voluntary, producers are more likely to display "low-fat" than "high-fat"labels on the FOP. This has two consequences. First, it is not obvious that making FOP labels mandatory will make consumers better o¤, as they can currently infer from the absence of any label that the product is high in fat. Second, the producer's decision to introduce a FOP label may depend on unobserved consumer tastes, rendering labelling endogenous in the demand function. Whether fat-content regulation should remain voluntary or become mandatory is an important research question, and comparing the e¤ects (on consumers and …rms) of mandatory fat labelling to those of a fat tax policy should help to begin the answer.
Previous research has often used continuous-choice demand models to evaluate the impact of . 3 These allow for substitution between food categories, which are more or less aggregated, but ignore any substitution either within food categories or towards an outside good. However, a fat tax is more likely to make consumers of high fat-content exit the market or switch to the nearest low fat-content counterparts in the same food group, rather than substitute one food category for another. In addition, producers'strategic reactions have generally nomial Logit model. In the estimation, we control for the (usual) endogeneity of prices, assuming that the product-speci…c valuation of the unobserved characteristics is independent from its past variations, but also for the (less classic) case where a characteristic is endogenous. As producers'
decisions to place a fat-content label on the packaging of a dessert yogurt may be correlated with unobserved consumer tastes, we also need to control for the endogeneity of fat-content labels. We do so by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided by exogenous variation in the labelling requirements for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. Household-speci…c demand parameters are then identi…ed from panel scanner data collected from a representative sample of households in 2007. These estimates are used to compute producer price-cost margins, assuming that they compete à la Nash in a Bertrand oligopolistic game. The new market equilibrium implied by each fat policy can then be simulated.
We show that imposing FOP fat labels reduces the average yearly fat purchases by households by about 38% when the …rm response is ignored. This is largely due to an aversion to fat labels by consumers of dessert yogurts, which is interpreted as a desire to have the taste without the guilt of eating unhealthily. When producers can adjust their prices, we …nd, perhaps surprisingly, that mandatory labelling increases the market share of dessert yogurts. This comes from the large price cuts that producers would e¤ect, via drastic margin reductions ( 68% for full-fat dessert yogurts). As labelling becomes mandatory for all products, product di¤erentiation falls, which intensi…es price competition. The price response of producers of dessert yogurts is made possible by the sizeable initial margins on dessert yogurts, and high price elasticities just after the policy shock: the fall in margins is o¤set by the recovery of large market shares. Firms are able to o¤set 96% of the e¤ect of the policy on consumer demand.
Comparing mandatory labelling to an equivalent fat tax (meaning that tax rates are set such that each policy causes almost the same fall in average yearly fat purchases in the absence of any …rm response), we show that when the …rm price response is taken into account taxes are somewhat more e¤ective than fat labels in reducing household fat purchases: 9% vs. 1:5% respectively.
One reason is that the fat tax maintains the market segmentation between fromages blancs and dessert yogurts, which avoids intensifying price competition. From a health-policy perspective, we suggest that the fat tax dominates mandatory labelling. From a consumer perspective, however, the opposite pertains: assuming perfect rationality, consumer welfare in this market rises by 53% under mandatory labelling, as a result of the fall in dessert yogurt prices, and falls by 2% with the fat tax. From the …rm's perspective, both policies reduce pro…t, but considerably more so under mandatory labelling ( 21%) than under the fat tax ( 6%).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and discusses the boundaries of the market. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and the estimation strategy.
The estimation results are then discussed in Section 4 and the simulations in Section 5. The last section concludes.
Data
We use household panel scanner data from Kantar Worldpanel (KWP) for the 2007 calendar year. The advantage of scanner data over the experimental or hypothetical choice approaches is that observations are based on actual purchases in a natural shopping environment. Consumer preferences can thus be identi…ed in a realistic setting.
There are 13; 380 households in the initial sample, which is nationally representative of the French population. The data record, on a weekly basis, all purchases of yogurts and fromages blancs for home consumption by the household over the year. The Universal Product Code (UPC) of each purchase is registered using a handheld scanner, as well as the quantity purchased and the associated expenditure. KWP does not provide UPCs, but a large set of product attributes. We choose to divide the year into 13 periods of four weeks (the time unit t in the next section). We thus focus on representative purchase behaviour in each four-week period, i.e. the choices that are the most-frequently observed in a sense that will be de…ned below. 6 
The relevant market
There are three broad categories of yogurts and fromages blancs: standard yogurts; standard fromages blancs; and dessert yogurts. This market was chosen for three reasons. First, it accounts for a quite substantial share of household fat purchases (2:75%). Second, a large variety of products are o¤ered, which allows consumers to easily switch from one brand to another. Last, the fact that labelling is mandatory in France for fromages blancs but not for yogurts makes it easier to identify consumer preferences over labelling and fat separately.
We restrict our analysis to plain products, which represent 43% of all purchases of yogurts and fromages blancs. Flavored yogurts and fromages blancs contain sugar additives. As such, fat-content labels may be less salient for consumers, and less relevant from a nutritional point of view. 7 We also eliminate products that are not made from cows' milk (4:5% of purchases), and drinking yogurts and yogurts with cereals, which account for less than 1:5% of purchases.
In the remaining sample, 46:3% of the households consuming fromages blancs over a four-week period also purchased standard yogurts, while only 5:4% purchased dessert yogurts. These statistics suggest that fromages blancs and standard yogurts are probably not substitutes competing on the same market, which is the case for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. A formal test comes from analyzing household budget choices between standard yogurts, dessert yogurts and fromages blancs, in a classic demand-system setting. Household expenditures on these three categories are aggregated over the year, and local price indices are computed for each category, as in Lecocq and Robin (2006) . An Almost Ideal Demand System is then estimated and the uncompensated cross-price elasticities are derived (Deaton and Mullbauer, 1980) . We …nd only one signi…cant crossprice elasticity, indicating that fromages blancs are substitutes for dessert yogurts (the elasticity is +0:398). An increase in the price of dessert yogurts or fromages blancs does not signi…cantly impact the consumption of standard yogurts (see the additional results in Appendix A.1). The analysis will hence focus on the relevant market for plain fromages blancs, which includes plain dessert yogurts but not standard yogurts. 8 Last, in order to aid our the identi…cation of consumer preferences, we only retain households which purchased fromages blancs or dessert yogurts in more than 10 weeks over the year. Since these households clearly have stable tastes for these products, we do not make inferences from noisy choices. This leaves us with data on 1785 households.
Product attributes
The data contain information on the fat content of all dessert yogurts and fromages blancs, as well as their texture, brand, pack size, type of milk used, whether it is organic or not, and whether probiotics (bi…dus) have been added or not. These attributes are used to de…ne the alternatives available on the French market in 2007.
Fat content and fat-content labels
We sort the products into three fat-content categories: full-fat (more than 6% fat), semi-skimmed (between 3% and 6%), and skimmed (less than 3%). 9 Fat-content labels are mandatory for all fromage blanc products. 10 However, the data do not provide any information about the presence of fat-content labels for dessert yogurts. We therefore collected additional data from a number of information sources. The main source is Mintel's Global New Products Database (GNPD), which shows high-resolution color images of the packaging of 80% of the products in our dataset, and their changes over time. This information is complemented by an examination of the monthly French publication Linéaires, which provides detailed descriptions and pictures of a number of new food products launched in France every month. Last, we also visited the popular website www. ‡ickr.com, which proposes more than 4 billion images, the French consumer network website www.ciao.fr, and, for a small number of products, old TV advertisements from the on-line audiovisual archives available of the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel. 
Other characteristics
We control for a number of other product characteristics, which were selected because they were signi…cant in preliminary regressions. Di¤erences in hedonic characteristics are captured by a set of discrete attributes indicating whether the product is a fromage blanc or a dessert yogurt, and whether its texture is smooth. Health characteristics other than the fat content are captured by a dummy variable indicating whether the product is organic or has probiotics added. 
Household choice set, choice and prices
These 279 products discussed above are distributed through a number of stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets. To simplify the analysis, we de…ne 14 homogenous categories of distribution channels, according to criteria such as the company name (for supermarkets and hypermarkets) and the store format (hard-discount, hyper and supermarkets, grocery stores). 11 We retain these two criteria because they are signi…cant determinants of quality positioning and pricing strategies.
For each distribution channel, we assume that the set of products observed in the yearly purchase data is that which was available in each period.
We know the distribution channels that were visited by each household in each period. We de…ne each household choice set as the set of all products available in these channels. Choice sets therefore vary both from one period to another for the same households, and across households (even living in the same place) in the same period, if they visited di¤erent distribution channels.
There are two situations regarding household choice in each period. If the household did not make any purchases or purchased a single product, then de…ning choice is not a problem. However, when more than one product was purchased, we have to choose that which is the most representative of household preferences. In order to avoid arbitrary choices, we select this at random with the selection probabilities being proportional to the share of each product in the household's annual 1 1 The 14 distribution channels are: independent hard discount such as Lidl and Aldi; hard discount Ed; hard discount Leader Price-Franprix; hyper and supermarket Intermarché; hypermarket Carrefour; hypermarket Casino; hypermarket and supermarket Cora; hypermarket Auchan; hypermarket Leclerc; hypermarket and supermarket U; supermarket Carrefour (Stock, Shopi, and Proxi); supermarket Casino (Monoprix, EcoService, PetitCasino, Spar, and Maxicoop); supermarket Auchan (Atac, and Maximarché); and other distribution channels such as cheesemongers, and grocery stores.
purchases. 12 The price of each product in the household-choice set is constructed in two steps. We …rst calculate the mean unit price for this product by distribution channel and period; we then average these mean unit prices over the distribution channels that were visited by the household during the period. Prices thus vary over time and between households according to the distribution channels visited.
Market characteristics
Given that the estimation procedure is time-consuming, we reduce the dataset to an extent by randomly selecting …ve periods for each household. To avoid having too much noise in the estimation process, we also exclude products that were purchased less than 10 times in a period. This leaves us with 224 di¤erent products. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the product characteristics, in the universal choice set containing all products and in the union of all household choice sets.
Note that there are far fewer low-and medium-quality products in the latter than in the former, simply because many of these are private labels that can be found in only one distribution channel.
[ Table 1 about here]
The main market characteristics are described in of the fromages blancs purchased are semi-skimmed, about 23% are skimmed, and as many are full-fat. By way of contrast, 72% of the dessert yogurts purchased are full-fat. On average, full-fat products are more expensive than the others, with smaller variations in prices for dessert yogurts than for fromages blancs.
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[ Table 2 about here]
Household characteristics
Our empirical speci…cation also includes household characteristics: income quartiles, household size, and three dummy variables indicating whether the head of the household is aged over 65, whether the main shopper is classi…ed as being risky overweight (BMI>27), and whether the main shopper is a man. Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of these variables, amongst others, in the estimation sample. These variables are interacted with product attributes in the estimation to account for the e¤ect of observable characteristics on preferences.
Following the empirical industrial organization literature , market equilibrium is modeled combining a ‡exible discrete-choice model of demand with a linear-pricing model of supply. This section describes this analytical framework, together with the estimation strategy and the simulation of each policy option.
Structural model for the demand side
Consumer preferences are modeled in a random-utility framework, via a Mixed Multinomial Logit model (MMNL) (Berry et al., 1995, McFadden and . Preferences over product characteristics are speci…ed in a ‡exible manner, as this allows for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the intercept and slopes of the utility function. Household heterogeneity in the Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for fat-content labels can thus be more precisely estimated. The MMNL also relaxes the "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives"constraint imposed by the standard Conditional (or Multinomial) Logit model, which is unlikely to hold at the aggregate level as the choice set varies from one household to another.
The random utility model
Each household i = 1; :::; N faces a set of J it products in a choice situation t = 1; :::; T . 14 Each product j 2 J it is described as a bundle of characteristics. As in many other papers, we assume that all product characteristics are observable (or can be observed by careful inspection) by consumers but some are unobserved by the econometrician. Examples of the observable characteristics are package size, brand, nutritional facts, etc; the unobserved characteristics include the position of the product within the range of products sold under the same brand or the way it is displayed and advertised in a particular distribution channel.
Formally, denote by p ijt the price of good j faced by household i in period t, and l j the binary variable indicating whether a fat-content label is displayed on the packaging of j. Further, let
x j denote the vector of observed exogenous attributes of j and let j = 0 be the outside (or no purchase) option, whose characteristics are all set to zero. Considering that each household buys only one product at a time, the utility that household i obtains from the consumption of one unit of good j in period t can be written as
where v ijt is the deterministic part of utility, depending on the observed attributes of j,
and i are parameters representing the preferences of household i over p ijt , l j and x j , respectively, and " ijt is unobserved utility. The latter captures consumer valuation of the unobserved product characteristics.
Endogenous prices and fat-content labels
There is empirical evidence that some of the observed and unobserved characteristics are correlated, producing endogeneity problems (Berry, 1994) . For instance, promoted products are often moved to the front of the shelf, advertised and sold at a lower price at the same time. The estimated impact of observed prices on demand will then capture both a true price e¤ect and the e¤ect of unobserved marketing. Prices may also be endogenous if some unobserved characteristics are positively valued by consumers, who thus are ready to pay a premium for them. This may be taken into account by producers in determining their prices. In both cases, we have E(" ijt j p ijt ) 6 = 0.
We instrument the current price by its lagged changes. The identifying assumption is that, controlling for brands, distribution channels, and demographics, the individual valuation of the product-speci…c unobserved characteristics, " ijt , is independent of its own past changes. Given this assumption, the valuation of a particular product will be independent of the price changes for that same product in the same distribution channel. 15 At the same time, common production and/or distribution costs imply that the price of a product within a distribution channel will be correlated with its past changes, which can therefore be used as valid instrumental variables (IVs).
The price changes that we consider are those observed between the current and the last period.
They are constructed in the same way as the price levels: for each product, the mean unit price and its change are …rst calculated for each distribution channel and period; these mean unit price changes are then averaged over the distribution channels that were visited by the household in the corresponding period.
Most papers dealing with endogeneity in MMNL models have focussed on price endogeneity, assuming the exogeneity of all other observed characteristics. We here relax this assumption for the fat-content label, as the producer's decision to put a fat-content label on the packaging of a dessert yogurt may be correlated with some unobserved consumer tastes. In this case,
An IV for fat-content labels can be constructed by exploiting the "quasi-natural experiment" from the exogenous variation in labelling rules between fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. Considering the absence of label as a treatment, we know that the probability of being treated is zero for fromages blancs, regardless of their fat content (since labelling is mandatory), and more or less positive for dessert yogurts, depending on their fat content. The marginal value of a fat-content label is then identi…ed from the empirical market shares, using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator, assuming that the di¤erences in unobservable factors between consumers of full-fat and semi-skimmed products are the same for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts. This assumption and the resulting exclusion restriction hold if the consumers of fromages blancs are not more sensitive to a fat increase than the consumers of dessert yogurts. In addition, it seems reasonable to consider that the decision to label a dessert yogurt is taken once and for all when introducing the product on the market. Changes in unobserved factors over time, in customer services or the perception of the product for example, have little to do with this (Ackerberg et al., 2005) . Last, the interaction between the dessert yogurt and the semi-skimmed (or full-fat) dummy variables is a good predictor of the producer's labelling decision: the fatter the dessert yogurt, the less likely the producer is to signal this to consumers. In our data set, full-fat dessert yogurts are indeed never labeled.
Empirical estimation of the demand functions 3.2.1 A control function approach to endogeneity
To correct for price and fat-content label endogeneity, decompose " ijt as
where e " p ijt is the error component related to the price, e " l ijt the error component related to the presence of a label, and e " ijt is an iid extreme-value term.
We then apply a control function approach, as proposed by Petrin and Train (2009) for discretechoice models. Consider the following orthogonal decompositions for e " 
Parameterisation of the utility function
Combining (1) to (3), and assuming a linear speci…cation for the deterministic part of the utility function v i ( ), we have
where
The tastes for observed product characteristics, 
where = ( p ; l ) is the vector of average tastes for the price and the label in the population, and
A, B and are respectively two matrices and a symmetric matrix of parameters (speci…cally, is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of i ). Under this speci…cation, the elements of + i correspond to the random coe¢ cients for the price and label variables; we assume that p i follows a log-normal distribution and l i a normal distribution. 16 The two distributions are correlated (the o¤-diagonal element of is non-zero). We hence end up with a MMNL model with mixing over the error components and random coe¢ cients for the endogenous variables.
Likelihood and estimation procedure
The choice probabilities can be obtained by summing the choices implied by the utility model over the distribution of the unobserved attributes of households in the population of interest, i
and e " ijt , as well as over the distribution of the error components, p ijt and l ijt . De…ne y ijt as an indicator variable which equals 1 if household i purchases good j in period t, and 0 otherwise. Each household is supposed to choose the utility-maximizing option, and assuming that ties occur with probability zero, the choice criterion is
= 0 otherwise.
Under the additional assumptions that there is no error component, i.e. e " p ijt = e " l ijt = 0, and that household heterogeneity enters the utility function only through the additive error term e " ijt , i.e. 1 6 The estimation does not converge when assuming a log-normal distribution for both coe¢ cients. 1 7 Although very attractive because of its extreme tractability, the MNL model unreasonably restricts substitution patterns (see, for example, Berry, 1994 ).
In the hypothetical situation where e " p ijt , e " l ijt and i are observed and are di¤erent from zero, the above model corresponds to a MNL formulation where the observed product characteristics and household attributes are interacted, with choice probabilities given by
where ijt = f p ijt ; l ijt g, is the full parameter set, P (y ijt = 1 j ijt ; i ; ) is the probability that alternative j is purchased by household i at time t conditional on ijt and i , and the utility derived from the consumption of the outside alternative is normalized to zero. The probability of observing the sequence of choices made by household i in periods t = 1; :::; T , denoted w i = fy ijt = 1g T t=1 , is then
However, since ijt and i are not actually observed, the relevant probability has to be unconditional, as follows
where f ( i ) is the joint density function of i and g( ijt ) = (
, with ( ) being the standard normal density function.
Given that each component of ijt and i adds a dimension to the integral, it is not possible to solve (11) analytically by integrating out over ijt and i . The most common solution is to replace the choice probability by the following unbiased, smooth and tractable simulator
where ijtd and id denote the d-th draw from the distributions of ijt and i , and D is the number of draws. The simulated log-likelihood function can then be written as
The estimation procedure consists of two steps. First, the residuals^ p ijt and^ l j are predicted by regressing the price and label variables on the instruments, all product characteristics, including their interactions with household attributes, as listed in Table 3 , and the distribution channel and brand …xed e¤ects. 19 These residuals are then used as control functions in the above likelihood function. The variance-covariance matrix is corrected to account for the additional variance introduced by the …rst-stage estimation. 1 8 In order to make the presentation simpler here, all of the other conditioning arguments (product and consumer attributes, reduced-form residuals) are omitted. 1 9 The identifying instrument for label is signi…cant at the 1% level in both …rst-stage regressions; the IV for price is signi…cant at the 1% level in the label regression and at the 10% level in the label regression.
Empirical identi…cation of the distribution of consumer tastes
The empirical identi…cation of MMNL models is known to depend on the richness of the data in terms of variation in the explanatory variables. 20 Cherchi and Ortúzar (2008) and label. 21 However, it seems reasonable to suppose that the labelling decision is taken when the product is introduced, and is not a¤ected by a fat tax (it becomes strictly exogenous in the case of mandatory labelling). 22 We thus focus on price as the …rm's only strategic variable. . Even when a model is shown to be theoretically identi…ed, it may not be empirically identi…ed, because the data do not support it. We here discuss empirical identi…cation. 2 1 While the explicit modeling of the …rm's pricing strategy is now common in the literature, modeling the …rm's choice of characteristics is both rarer and complicated: see Crawford and Shum (2001) , who model the …rm's choice of quality but only deal with monopoly situations with one observed characteristic; another approach mentioned by Ackerberg et al. (2007) is similar to Olley and Pakes (1996) and requires dynamic modeling. 2 2 This is justi…ed by the fact that …rms often prefer to introduce new food products rather than modify the characteristics of existing ones.
The linear-pricing model
We assume that …rms compete à la Nash-Bertrand, i.e. by setting prices in order to maximise their pro…t conditional on the demand parameters and other …rms'prices, as in Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) . 23 Suppose that there are M producers on the market, each producing a subset G m of G, the total number of products on the market. Denoting by p j and c j the price and (constant)
marginal cost of production of product j, respectively, the pro…t of producer m, m , can be written
where s j (p; ) is the predicted market share of product j for all j 2 G, depending on the prices of all products, p, and demand parameters. 24 Market share is calculated as s j (p; ) = P i;t P (y ijt = 1 j ), where
which can be approximated by simulation, with P (y ijt = 1 j ijt ; i ; ) given by (9) . Assuming a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, the price of good j produced and sold by producer m must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions
for all j 2 G m and m = 1; :::; M . Solving (15) provides the price-cost margins for each product, as a function of the estimated demand parameters. Given the observed prices, the marginal costs are identi…ed. Assuming that the marginal costs and demand parameters are …xed, the equilibrium condition (15) can then be used to identify the impact of public policies on the market equilibrium (equilibrium prices and market shares). We analyze the mandatory labelling of all dessert yogurts on the one hand, and a fat tax proportional to the fat content on the other.
Simulation algorithm
The implementation of mandatory labelling implies the replacement of the label variable by a vector of ones, l . 25 We recalculate, for each producer m and each item in G m , the new market shares, s j (p; ), and all of the corresponding derivatives, @s k (p; )=@p j , using the new label variable, l , the estimated demand parameters and probability (14) , where v ijt and c ijt are now as follows . The hypothesis of capacity constraints is maintained, which means that our results will pertain to the short-term equilibrium e¤ects of policies. 2 4 For each product, there is now one single price which is the average, over periods and distribution channels, of the mean unit prices computed in Section 2.3. This therefore no longer depends on the i and t subscripts. 2 5 We assume that the labeling cost is zero or negligible for two reasons: …rst, as the fat-content is listed in the nutrient facts displayed on the packaging of all products, its determination for dessert yogurts is costless; second, as mandatory labeling simply consists in sticking a fat-content label on the front of the packaging, marketing and associated costs should be small relative to the product's total cost.
The terms used to correct for label endogeneity here vanish from the ' ijt expression since the label variable is strictly exogenous once the policy is implemented. The …rst-order conditions (15) are then used to …nd a new price vector, p 0 , given s j (p; ) and @s k (p; )=@p j . If p 0 is close enough to the observed price vector, p, equilibrium prices are unchanged. Otherwise, a new price vector, p iter , at the iter-th iteration is derived from
for all j 2 G m and m = 1; :::; M . The market shares are obtained using (14) with
where^ p j;iter 1 is the residual from the regression of p j;iter 1 on z ijt and all exogenous variables. We iterate over p iter until convergence is reached, that is when max j jp j;iter p j;iter 1 j < 10 5 .
We assume that the fat tax is ad valorem, proportional to the fat content, such that the consumer price for product j is
where p j denotes the producer price for product j and cat;j the tax rate assigned to product j in the fat-content category cat. Below, cat;j is set equal to 0, 0:05 or 0:10 when j is a skimmed, semi-skimmed or full-fat product, respectively. In the same way as for the algorithm described to calculate equilibrium prices under mandatory labelling, we obtain a new vector of producer prices, p iter , at the iter-th iteration solving
for all j 2 G m and m = 1; :::; M , where p represents the new consumer price vector whose j-th element p j is given by p j = (1 + cat;j )p j;iter 1 . As above, we iterate over the producer price vector until max j jp j;iter p j;iter 1 j < 10 5 .
Estimation results
This section presents the MMNL estimates obtained using the control function approach described in Section 3 to correct for the endogeneity of price and label variables. All of the estimations below are carried out using 500 Halton draws. 26 The variances of the estimators are corrected by standard formulae for two-step estimators (Murphy and Topel, 1985) , given the additional variation due to the introduction of the residuals from the …rst-step instrumental regressions. 2 6 One di¢ culty with MMNL models is that the simulated log-likelihood functions are not as well-behaved as standard log-likelihood functions. In particular, using too few draws in the simulator (12) may mask identi…cation issues (see Chiou and Walker, 2007) . These can be revealed by the instability of parameter and standard error estimates as the number of draws increases. We estimated the model for D = 100; 200; 300; 500 and 1000 draws, and obtained stable estimates from D = 300 onwards. These results are available upon request from the authors. Table 4 shows the estimated coe¢ cients of the MMNL model: these can be interpreted directly in terms of marginal utilities. As outlined in the previous section, price and label marginal utilities have both deterministic and random components. The …rst column shows the mean marginal utility of the product characteristics for a reference main shopper who is a woman aged under Table 4 provides the estimates of the price and label control functions and the variances of the associated error components.
Utility functions
[ Table 4 about here]
As expected, the probability of choosing an alternative falls with its price. The marginal utility of price is the inverse of the marginal utility of income. Its mean is negative ( 1:870), and larger for households below median income, which is consistent with poorer households having a higher marginal utility of income. The standard deviation of the random e¤ect on price is fairly high
(1:995), implying that the marginal utility of income is very heterogeneous, beyond the e¤ect of the observed socio-demographic attributes.
Fat-content labels have, on average, a positive value (0:592 for the reference individual), but once again the standard deviation is large relative to the mean e¤ect (3:850): there considerable unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences over these labels. The elderly tend to dislike fatcontent labels, while there is a hump-shaped income e¤ect peaking in the second income quartile.
The marginal utility of labels is not signi…cantly higher when the main shopper is risky overweight (BMI>27). The random unobserved household attributes are negatively correlated, with a coe¢ -cient of 0:77. A strong taste for labels is likely associated with a greater marginal disutility of price, which limits the willingness-to-pay for labels.
The coe¢ cients on the control functions, at the bottom of Table 4 , are both positive and signi…cant. Ignoring label endogeneity leads to over-estimates of the marginal utility of labels, with an estimated mean base coe¢ cient of 1:710 (instead of 0:592). This suggests that, when labelling is not mandatory, …rms display labels according to the consumer valuation of some unobserved product characteristics. It is easy to imagine that, in the case of semi-skimmed dessert yogurts, the label is just one component of the whole packaging, which can also generate hedonic and health expectations through the use of speci…c colors, shapes, etc. (see inter alia Ares and Deliza, 2010). Likewise, the marginal disutility of price is slightly underestimated when the presence of unobserved product characteristics is ignored ( 1:763 vs. 1:870).
Households tend to prefer semi-skimmed and full-fat products to skimmed ones. This taste for fat is more developed in low-income households, and when the main shopper is a man or elderly.
Valli and Traill (2005) . Risky-overweight individuals are more likely to be concerned by the fat-disease relationship, but also to exhibit a strong taste for fat. The polarization of their preferences between low-and full-fat products then likely re ‡ects opposite hierarchies of purchase motives: for some health matters more than taste, while the reverse holds for others. Table 4 also reveals that low-and medium-quality products are much less popular than highquality ones for high-income households, while they have more success in low-income and large households. Male main shoppers are less likely to like products sold in small portions. 27 Last, the bi…dus/organic characteristic has no signi…cant e¤ect on utility, while smooth textures are associated with a utility loss, consistent with the fact that non-smooth varieties (especially faisselles and fromages blancs de campagne) are considered as luxuries and part of French culinary culture.
The Willingness-To-Pay for a fat-content label
The Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) for a label is de…ned as the change in price (here expressed in e) that keeps utility unchanged when a fat-content label is added to the front and sides of the packaging. A household-speci…c WTP can be calculated from the estimates, conditional on householdspeci…c information (observed choices, product and household characteristics), from equation (??) in Appendix A.2.
Our key …nding is that a non negligible fraction of households (38%) have WTPs less than or equal to zero (see Table A .2 in the Appendix). 28 This proportion varies by demographic group, but not very much: in particular, it is the same whether the main shopper in the household is risky overweight or not, and only slightly higher (41%) when the shopper is obese; moreover, it is only a little lower in the …rst income quartile (35% vs. 39-40% in the upper quartiles), which suggests that labelling policies may not have regressive welfare e¤ects.
Fat-content labels are thus not positively valued by all consumers, and mandatory labelling may then reduce their welfare, at least in the short run. This result is at odds with the standard predictions from the economics of information, where information provision is considered to always enhance consumer welfare as it favors market segmentation, which leads to a better match between consumer preferences and product characteristics. Here, it seems that it is the absence of information that favors product di¤erentiation and market segmentation. As noted above, fat is a vector of immediate hedonic pleasure, but also produces unpleasant health consequences. When consumers are in con ‡ict between the short-term pleasure of eating and the long-term goal of health preservation, informing them of the nutritional value of the choice options is likely to increase the anticipated guilt and psychic costs associated with less-healthy products. The fall in utility is larger for consumers who have a strong hedonic taste for fat (Wansink and Chandon, 2006 , Kivetz and Keinan, 2006 , Okada, 2005 . They may thus prefer not to deal with information, in order to peacefully enjoy the pleasure of eating a product that they enjoy. 29 Nevertheless, it remains the case that a large majority of households are ready to pay positive amounts to have fat-content labels displayed on the front-of-pack. This is also true for those in the …rst income quartile and with a risky-overweight/obese main shopper, which suggests that the welfare bene…ts produced by fat-content labels are likely to be positive in the populations usually targeted by public-health policies.
One last remark is in order. Caplin and Leahy (2001) propose a theoretical framework that can be used to rationalize preferences for ignorance. The basic idea is that individuals may be subject to anticipatory feelings of anxiety in their current utility when the distribution of choice outcomes is uncertain. This can induce aversion to information, as the worst distribution can emerge from the resolution of uncertainty (see Köszegi, 2003 , for an application to medical check-ups). Although this type of preference departs from traditional utility speci…cations, it does not require that we abandon the principle of revealed preferences. As such, we can use the estimated utility functions for welfare analysis.
Price-cost margins
Marginal costs are recovered for each product by inverting the …rst-order conditions in (15) . Their mean (and standard deviation), as well as the associated average price-cost margins, are then computed for each producer. These cannot however be listed in detail here for con…dentiality 2 9 Marketing research has shown that anticipation of guilt feelings plays an important role in food choices (Baumeister, 2002; Dhar and Simonson, 1999; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Wertenbroch, 1998; King et al., 1987) . The trade publication Linéaires, covering the launch of a new dessert yogurt in its issue of April 2001 (p. 50), reports that the producer explicitly wanted to avoid feelings of guilt among consumers. This was made through the choice of packaging colors and words reminiscent of "lightness" (a light blue colour scheme, the words "pearl" or "foam" etc.).
reasons. On average, the marginal costs and price-cost margins are equal to e1:33 (with a standard deviation of e0:69) and 47%, respectively. Unsurprisingly, unit costs are lower for the main retailer brands (between e0:73 and e1:02) than for the main national brands (between e1:23 and e1:69)
Nevertheless, the price-cost margins for both types of brands are quite similar, so that di¤erences in production costs are passed onto consumer prices. The top panel of Table 7 shows the initial market shares, producer prices and margins for …ve categories of products (skimmed, semi-skimmed and full-fat fromages blancs, and semi-skimmed and full-fat dessert yogurts). The margins are between 60% and 70% for the dessert yogurts, and around 45% for the fromages blancs.
Ex ante policy evaluation
The methodology described in Section 3.3 is applied to the above-estimated demand functions, to ex ante evaluate two fat policies: (i ) mandatory labelling requiring all products to label fat-content on the front-of-pack; and (ii ) an ad-valorem fat tax. Tax rates are set so as to produce a meaningful comparison between the two policies. As one key comparison criterion is household fat purchased, we choose the tax rates for semi-skimmed and full-fat products so as to yield approximately the same reduction in total fat purchases as mandatory labelling, in the absence of any …rm response.
Increasing producer prices by 10% and by 5% for full-fat and semi-skimmed products respectively produces this result (see the …rst line of Table 5 ).
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The policies are simulated both with and without a producer price response, to compare their e¤ectiveness in reducing the quantity of fat purchased, and their impact on market shares, prices and consumer surplus. We …rst present the results in terms of health (fat purchases) and welfare.
We then explore in detail the market mechanisms behind these results. Table 5 lists the change in household annual fat purchases, by demographic group, with and without producer price reactions. Household annual fat purchases are calculated by multiplying the predicted choice probabilities by …rst the fat content of each product and then the 2007 purchase frequency. Pre-policy, 844g of fat were purchased on average per year by households participating in this market. Ignoring producer price responses, the policies produce large falls in fat purchases:
The change in household fat purchases and welfare
of 300 325g (around 38%) After accounting for the producer price response, this …gure is 76:5g ( 9:1%) for the fat tax and 12:5g ( 1:5%) for labelling. If we aggregate these results over all households and extrapolate them to the entire French population, 2; 361 tons of fat are initially purchased by households via fromage blanc and dessert yogurt. Fat tax and mandatory labelling lead to falls of 5:55% and 0:9% (not shown in the table).
3 0 In all of the simulations we assume that the set of products is …xed and that pricing is the only strategy available to …rms: product entry is excluded.
The fat tax a¤ects all demographic groups similarly (between 8% and 10%), except households where the main shopper is a man ( 6:4%). The e¤ects of mandatory labelling show more variation, with a tiny increase in fat purchases in households whose main shopper is obese (+0:2%), and a large fall for households in the …rst income quartile ( 4:4%).
[ Table 5 about here] Table 6 shows the change in household consumer surplus by demographic group, when producer price responses are taken into account. 31 A fat tax reduces surplus by 2:1% on average, as consumer prices rise. Conversely, mandatory labelling yields a large rise in average surplus (52:5%).
Di¤erences by demographic group are only small.
[ Table 6 about here]
Why does mandatory labelling have such an e¤ect on consumer surplus? We now show that this is generated by the large fall in the price of dessert yogurts, which more than o¤sets any disutility from labels which is mainly found for consumers of dessert yogurts.
Impact on market equilibrium, producer margins and pro…ts
The e¤ects of both policies on market shares, prices and margins are summarized in Table 7 .
The middle and bottom panels present changes in shares, prices and margins following mandatory labelling and a fat tax, respectively, while the top panel describes the initial situation. For each policy, the …rst line represents the change in market share, in percentage points (pp), when only household responses are taken into account; the three remaining lines show the changes in shares (pp), prices (e) and margins (pp) after producer price responses.
[ Table 7 about here]
A …rst striking result is that the simulated market equilibrium changes sharply when we allow for producer price responses. When we ignore them, shown above by the changes in fat purchases, both policies hit the target, although in di¤erent ways. Overall, mandatory labelling appears more e¢ cient than the fat tax in reducing the demand for full-fat products ( 8:6 pp vs.
4:9 pp).
The fall in the market share of full-fat dessert yogurts, from 17:6% to 5:0% ( 12:6 pp), following the introduction of a label is far from o¤set by the rise in the market share of (cheaper) full-fat fromages blancs (+4 pp). All fromage blanc categories (as well as the outside option) bene…t from this fall. The explanation is that, apart from their taste for fat, most dessert yogurt consumers are fat lovers who do not want to be informed about the fat they eat. Their WTP for fat-content labels is indeed low, and often negative: for instance, the median WTP amongst households who purchased a full-fat dessert yogurt at least once is e4:74. By way of comparison, the …gure for households who purchased a full-fat fromage blanc at least once is e0:42 (see Table A .3 in Appendix A.2). Dessert yogurt consumers may move not only to full-fat fromages blancs because they are cheaper, but also to lighter categories of fromages blancs to attenuate the psychic costs of eating fatty products; they may stop consuming as well.
Allowing for supply-side price responses completely changes this picture. Labelling then leads to a small rise in the market share of dessert yogurts (+1:1 pp for full-fat dessert yogurts), at the expense of skimmed and semi-skimmed fromages blancs ( 1:9 pp and 8:1 pp, respectively).
This can be explained by the large fall in the price of dessert yogurts: semi-skimmed and fullfat dessert yogurts exhibit price falls of about e0:95 and e1:39, respectively, hence becoming the cheapest products on this market. In spite of this fall in prices, the margins remain positive for all products.
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In the absence of a strategic price response, the fat-tax impact on market shares is smaller than that of mandatory labelling, especially for full-fat dessert yogurts. This however reverses with producer price responses. The market share is reduced by 2:3 pp for full-fat fromages blancs, and by 1:4 pp for full-fat dessert yogurts. The corresponding increase in the share of skimmed fromage blancs (+2:8 pp) and semi-skimmed dessert yogurts (+1 pp) shows that households move away from the fatter varieties. The changes in market share are smaller as producers do not fully pass the tax on to consumer prices. For instance, for full-fat dessert yogurts, the …nal increase in consumer price with 100% pass-through would be e0:31 (3:06 times the tax of 10%), whereas it is only e0:12 (i.e. (3:06 0:17) 110% minus 3:06) with a price response. This means that the pass-through rate is under 40%: producers are willing to absorb a large part of the intended policy shock on consumer prices. Table 8 shows the changes in market share by demographic group after …rm price responses.
Under mandatory labelling, the consumption of full-fat dessert yogurts increases more in households whose main shopper is obese (+4:7 pp, compared to +1:1 pp for the whole population). In addition, this group consumes less skimmed and semi-skimmed fromage blanc, with the market shares falling by 3:0 pp and 10:1 pp, respectively. Labelling thus fails to achieve the objective of changing the choices of those who would really need to switch from full-to lower-fat products. Again, the fat tax seems to be a better policy, as it induces substitution from full-fat to skimmed and semi-skimmed products for households with obese main shoppers.
[ Table 8 about here]
The changes in pro…ts and market share are not shown here in detail for con…dentiality reasons. Annual pro…ts are calculated using predicted market share and observed household purchase frequencies for fromages blancs and dessert yogurts over the year, extrapolated to the French population using the sampling weights provided by Kantar WorldPanel. Both policies reduce producers'
annual pro…ts, with a larger e¤ect from labelling ( 21:0%) than from the fat tax ( 6:1%). Producer price responses help them to limit the fall in sales, but require them to reduce their margins
(especially under mandatory labelling). The main national brands su¤er more from labelling than do retailer brands, with the fall in pro…ts ranging from 34:4% to 76:6% for the former, and 11:3%
to 20:6% for the latter.
The producer price response aims to minimise the fall in pro…ts. This can be explained by three factors: initial margins; the elasticity and concavity of demand curves; and the competition between producers and, for each producer, between products in its portfolio.
In the case of mandatory labelling for dessert yogurts, producers can a¤ord large price cuts on these products as margins are initially substantial: the initial price-cost margin is 67% for full-fat dessert yogurts, as opposed to only 41% for full-fat fromages blancs. In addition, the estimated own-price elasticity of demand for full-fat dessert yogurts is 5:1 in the absence of a price response.
Producers can hence expect to win back market share via price cuts. This strategy is constrained by two factors. First, demand becomes less and less elastic as price falls: the elasticity of full-fat dessert yogurts is 2:4 after the price response. Pro…t maximisation entails a trade-o¤ between lower margins and a larger market share, which is partly determined by the concavity of the demand function, i.e. the change in elasticity (see Stern, 1987 , and Delipalla and Keen, 1992 for the case of taxation under imperfect competition). Second, each producer faces the price response of all of the other producers and must in addition optimise its own response over its portfolio of products. For instance, the demand elasticity for full-fat fromages blancs is 4:8 in the absence of price response.
The producers of these full-fat products have the means of countering the lower price of dessert yogurts, although they are constrained by their lower initial margins. Mandatory labelling actually increases competition on the market, by making products more similar. The Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market shares is initially 921; this would fall to 770 without any price response. For the tax policy, and without any price response, the HHI only changes little (906 instead of 921).
Conclusion
This paper has developed an ex ante evaluation of the impacts of a fat tax and mandatory labelling on market equilibrium. This evaluation requires the separate identi…cation of consumer preferences for fat-content labels and fat. This is made possible by an exogenous change in legal fat-content labelling requirements in the French fromage blanc and dessert yogurt market. Following the recent literature in empirical industrial organization, we combine a ‡exible discrete-choice model of demand, estimated on scanner data (disaggregated at both the household and product levels), with a linear-pricing supply model to recover price-cost margins for each manufacturer and to determine the food-policy impact on market outcomes.
In the absence of a producer price response, making fat labels mandatory reduces household fat purchases by about 38%. To obtain a similar e¤ect, and thus compare mandatory labelling to the fat tax, we set ad valorem taxes of 10% and 5% on the producer price of full-fat and semi-skimmed products, respectively. Taking into account producer price responses is shown to dramatically change the policy evaluation. Fat taxes then result in a more modest reduction in fat purchases of about 9%. However, mandatory labelling reduces household fat purchases by only 1:5%, as dessert yogurt producers cut their margins to retain customers. This producer reaction entails a large fall in the price of dessert yogurts, o¤setting 96% of the impact of front-of-pack fat-content labels. As prices are lower, mandatory labelling likely increases consumer welfare in the short run, while the fat tax has the opposite e¤ect. Although these welfare calculations do not take into account the long-run bene…ts of reduced fat intake, the estimated changes in the latter are only small, so that the health e¤ects will arguably be so as well.
The key policy message of our research here is thus that there is no magic bullet to reduce fat consumption when we rely only on standard policy tools, as market mechanisms -here the While this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst to encompass structurally the question of prices and labels, there are three limitations to our analysis. First, all of the simulation results are based on a supply model without explicit modelling of the vertical relationships between retailers and producers. Although the results are very similar when we model them as a two-part tari¤ contract with resale price maintenance (where wholesale prices are such that the retailer's pricecost margins are zero), it would be interesting to check whether other types of vertical relationships have signi…cant consequences for the market equilibrium. Second, the set of products is supposed to be …xed, so that …rms can only use pricing strategies. However, …rms may change their products too; new products may enter the market, and other products may exit. Last, the demand model does not take into account, in a structural way, the health e¤ects of fat consumption. As such, it is di¢ cult to evaluate the long-run welfare e¤ects of each policy, and to rank the various options according to health. While the short-and long-run welfare e¤ects are probably only little di¤erent for a single product, this would certainly not be the case for policies which target a large range of products. We leave these questions for future research. Note: Column 1 refers to the means over 224 products, and column 2 to the means over 8497 observed purchases. 54 (54) 63 (63) 63 (63) 24 (12) 20 ( 18.2%
Tables
Note: The mean prices are calculated over the universal product set; using the household choice set yields fairly similar results. , and denote signi…cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; the column "Std. Dev." shows the standard deviation of the random coe¢ cients; the random coe¢ cients are distributed according to the opposite of a lognormal law for price, and to a normal law for the label; their coe¢ cient of correlation is -0.77 ; the other control variables are the …xed e¤ects for the 14 distribution channels and the 15 brands or groups of brands (results available from the authors on request); these results are obtained with D = 500 draws; the reference individual is a female main shopper in the top income quartile, aged under 65, whose BMI is under 27. Notes: Under mandatory labeling all products have a fat-content label; under the fat tax, there is an ad valorem tax of 10% for full-fat and 5% for semi-skimmed products; all results include the producers'price responses. Notes: Mandatory labeling requires all products to display a fat-content label; the fat tax increases the producer prices of full-fat and semi-skimmed products by 10% and 5% respectively; the abbreviation pp stands for percentage point; price and margin changes are averages by product category, weighted by product market share; margins are given by (price-mc)/price, where mc denotes the marginal cost; price and margin changes include …rms'strategic pricing responses. Notes: Under the labeling policy, all products have a fat-content label; under the fat tax there is an ad valorem tax of 10% on full-fat and 5% on semi-skimmed products; all of the results include the producers'price responses. 
A.2 Distribution of household WTP conditional on observed choices
The estimates resulting from the maximisation of (13), can be used to determine the distribution of tastes over the sampled households, f i ; i g, as well as functions of these, conditional on the household's observed choices and population parameters (Revelt and Train, 2000) . Formally, if h( i ) is such a function, its conditional expectation is given by
where g( ijt j w i ) and f ( i j w i ) are the densities of ijt and i conditional on the household's observed sequence of choices. From Bayes'rule, we have E(h( i ) j w i ; ) = R E(h( i ) j w i ; ijt ; i ; )P (w i j ijt ; i ; )g( ijt )f ( i )d i d ijt P (w i j ) :
Similarly to (11), and still denoting by ijtd and id the d-th draws from the distribution of ijt and i , this expectation can be approximated through simulation by E(h( i ) j w i ; ) = P D d=1 E(h( i ) j w i ; ijtd ; id ; ; )P (w i j ijtd ; id ; ) e P (w i j ) ;
where e P (w i j ) is given by (12) . With h( i ) = 
